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I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution of the United States prohibits the
infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.”1 However, a
consistently asked question is what constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. In 1958, the Supreme Court stated that
“the basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man,”2 and recognized that the
“words of the [Eighth] Amendment are not precise, and that
[the Court's] scope is not static.”3 Thus, “[t]he Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”4 Accordingly, the
constitutionality of the death penalty—specifically the

1

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

2

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).

3

Id. at 100-01.

4

Id. at 101.
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implementation of it—depends on what society deems
appropriate at a given time.
To date, the death penalty does not per se constitute
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. However, as society’s standard of decency has
narrowed, certain impositions of the death penalty have been
found to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically,
a death sentence is only warranted for offenders who have
committed first-degree murder.5 Additionally, the death
penalty cannot be imposed on intellectually disabled
individuals or juveniles because these specific classes of
offenders essentially have a reduced criminal culpability,
rendering the punishment of death disproportionate. 6
Recently, there has been a growing controversy in the
United States as to whether executing an offender suffering
from a severe mental defect constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a severe
mental defect that has historically carried little weight as a
defense in the criminal justice system. However, as the
American people develop a better understanding of PTSD and
the effect it can have on an offender's criminal culpability, its
role in a criminal defense should be weighed more heavily. For
PTSD to play a valid role in the criminal justice system it must
be accurately understood, diagnosed, and deemed admissible.
Furthermore, an admissible PTSD diagnosis must be
appropriately placed in a defense.
Initially, PTSD must be diagnosed by a qualified mental
health physician, and that physician must testify as an expert
witness at trial for the offender’s PTSD diagnosis to be
admissible. While the admissibility of an offender’s PTSD is
essential, appropriately placing a PTSD diagnosis in the
offender’s defense is equally important. There are three
potential places for PTSD to fit within a defense. First, PTSD

5

Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).

See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (Court holding it
unconstitutional to execute intellectually disabled individuals, and
creating an exclusionary category exempting those offenders from
the death penalty); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (Court
finding that executing any offender under the age of eighteen
unconstitutional, and creating an exclusionary category exempting
that specific class of offenders from the death penalty).
6
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seemingly would fit within the insanity defense. However,
PTSD would fall in-between the cracks of the inconsistent tests
applied in various jurisdictions throughout the United States.
Second, it seems appropriate to consider PTSD as a mitigating
circumstance to be weighed against the case’s aggravating
circumstances at the sentencing phase of trial. However, an
offender’s mental illness does not generally carry much weight
as a mitigating circumstance in a capital case, and PTSD is such
a severe mental defect that it should carry a significant amount
of weight. Thus, according to today’s standards of human
decency, an exclusionary category should be created to exempt
offenders who were suffering from PTSD at the time of the
offense from the death penalty.

II. UNDERSTANDING PTSD
Until recently there has been little information
regarding PTSD and the effect it commonly has on those who
have it. Now that this information has become readily available,
what PTSD is and who can have it is better understood. Thus,
it has become apparent that PTSD reduces an offender’s
criminal culpability.

A. ANYONE CAN HAVE PTSD
PTSD is an anxiety disorder that occurs “exclusively in
persons who have experienced an emotional or physical trauma
of the highest magnitude.”7 When one hears the term PTSD,
they automatically think about combat veterans. While combat
veterans are historically considered the majority of those who
fall victim to PTSD, this disorder is not limited to veterans
alone.
Rather, overwhelming stressors that may lead to PTSD include
“war, rape, assault, accidents, fires, and natural disasters.”8

Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) as a Defense to Murder, Assault, or other Violent Crime, 4 A.L.R.
7th 5 (2020).
7

8

Id.
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The earliest information on PTSD came from studies of
male combat veterans, specifically Vietnam Veterans.9
Eventually, researchers began to see a parallel between the
trauma of male combat veterans and the trauma of women who
suffered from sexual assault, and ultimately found that a
women’s sexual trauma experience also can lead to PTSD
similar to that of a combat veteran.10 Retired army colonel, Dr.
Elspeth Cameron Ritchie, stated that “[i]n some ways, the
trauma from sexual assault may be worse than the trauma from
combat because normally, soldiers are prepared and trained for
combat.”11 Similarly, researchers found that children and teens
can develop PTSD if they have lived through a trauma that
could have caused them or someone else to be killed or severely
injured.12 Thus, under the right traumatic circumstances,
anyone—regardless of age, gender, or profession—can have
PTSD.
B. PTSD TRIGGERS
When an individual suffers from PTSD, certain triggers
can cause that individual to act irrationally as if he or she were
re-living the traumatic event that initially caused his or her
PTSD, resulting in the victim reacting to that trigger without
realizing exactly what he or she is doing. Specifically, “being
‘triggered’ more narrowly refers to the experience of people
with [PTSD] re-experiencing symptoms of a traumatic event
(such as exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury,

PTSD: National Center for PTSD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS,
https://www.ptsd.va.gov/understand/common/common_women.
asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2020).
9
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Id.

Heather Mayer Irvine, The Most Common PTSD Triggers—and How
to Manage Them, HEALTH (Apr. 3, 2020, 1:45 PM),
https://www.health.com/condition/ptsd/ptsd-triggers.
11

PTSD: National Center for PTSD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS,
https://www.ptsd.va.gov/understand/common/common_children
_teens.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2020).
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or sexual violation) after being exposed to a trigger that is a
catalyst or reminder.”13
Commonly, sights, sounds, smells, and emotions that a
PTSD victim associates with their trauma are considered PTSD
triggers.14 Veterans suffering from PTSD are often triggered by
the smell of burning meat, which resembles the smell of charred
flesh during action, and diesel fuel that is used in military
trucks.15 Such veterans are also commonly triggered by the
sound of helicopters or loud bangs.16 Likewise, sexual assault
victims suffering from PTSD are commonly triggered by
sounds, smells, or any other circumstance that reminds the
victim of the assault.17
Even though it has yet to be determined exactly how
these triggers are formed, it is known “that triggers can cause
an emotional reaction before a person realizes why they have
become upset.”18 Thus, any person with PTSD, when triggered,
may make a bad choice or partake in a bad act without knowing
the magnitude of what he or she is doing.

III. ADMISSIBILITY OF PTSD
When a person suffering from PTSD commits an offense,
the PTSD is relevant to the offender’s criminal culpability.
However, before the offender’s PTSD can be considered by the
court, it must first be deemed admissible. Accordingly, for the
offender’s PTSD to be deemed admissible, it must be
appropriately diagnosed and meet the legal standard.

Arlin Cuncic, What Does it Mean to Be ‘Triggered’, VERYWELLMIND
(Apr. 3, 2020, 2:20 PM), https://www.verywellmind.com/whatdoes-it-mean-to-be-triggered-4175432.
13
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Id.
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Heather Mayer Irvine, supra note 11.
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Id.
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Id.
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Arlin Cuncic, supra note 13.
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A. DIAGNOSING PTSD
As the understanding of who can have PTSD has
broadened, the theories and processes of how PTSD is
diagnosed have evolved accordingly. Currently, PTSD must be
diagnosed by a mental health care physician by determining
that eight criteria are present.19 Specifically, the criteria look to
the existence of a person’s stressor(s), the existence of intrusion
symptoms, the person’s avoidance of trauma-related stimuli
after the trauma, negative alterations in the person’s cognition
and mood, trauma-related arousal and reactivity, the duration
of the person’s symptoms, the person’s distress or functional
impairment, and the absence of any other causes.20

B. LEGAL STANDARD
Even after a mental health care physician has made an
official medical PTSD diagnosis, the diagnosis must satisfy the
legal standard to be admissible at trial. For a diagnosis of PTSD
to be considered valid according to the legal standard, the
diagnosing physician must testify and qualify as a credible and
reliable expert witness under the applicable evidentiary rules.
For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify in the form of an opinion
or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony
is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably

DSM-5 Criteria for PTSD, BRAINLINE,
https://www.brainline.org/article/dsm-5-criteria-ptsd (last visited
Mar. 10, 2020).
19

20

Id.
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applied the principles and methods to the facts
of the case.21
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has enumerated a list of
nonexclusive factors that a trial court might consider in
determining whether an expert’s reasoning and methodology is
reliable: (1) whether the theory or technique has been or could
be tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subject
to peer review and publication; (3) what the rate of error of the
technique or theory was when applied; (4) the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s
operation; and (5) whether the theory or technique has been
generally accepted in the scientific community.22
Accordingly, so long as a PTSD diagnosis and the
diagnosing physician meet these elements, the offender’s PTSD
should be admissible. Once an offender’s PTSD has been
deemed admissible, the next issue regarding this mental defect
is its place in a case. Specifically, where and offender’s PTSD
will most appropriately fit in a defensive argument when the
offender is subject to the death penalty.

IV. PTSD AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE
There has been an ongoing debate about where PTSD
fits within an offender’s defense in a capital case. One argument
is that PTSD should be covered within the insanity defense.
Throughout much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
the insanity defense evolved significantly.23 At common law,
the applicable insanity defense test was the M’Naughten Test,
which solely focused on an offender’s cognitive impairment.24
In the 1970s, the American Law Institute (ALI) established a

21

Fed. R. Evid. 702 (2020).

22

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993).

Major Jeremy A. Ball, Solving the Mystery of Insanity Law: Zealous
Representation of Mentally Ill Servicemembers, 2005 ARMY LAW. 1, 16
(2005).
23

W. Chris Jordan, Conditioned to Kill: Volition, Combat Related PTSD,
and the Insanity Defense—Providing a Uniform Test for Uniformed
Trauma, 16 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 22, 35-37 (2019).
24
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broader test that expanded beyond a mere cognitive test and
also looked to volitional impartments, known as the Model
Penal Code (MPC) Test.25 However, Congress largely
resurrected the M’Naughten Test by passing the Insanity
Defense Reform Act of 1984, when many jurisdictions began
rejecting the MPC Test on the basis that it was too lenient.26 The
gradual expansion—and again narrowing—of the insanity
defense has led to the development of various insanity defense
tests among jurisdictions, which can lead to arbitrariness and
conflict among courts in different jurisdictions. Specifically,
various jurisdictions follow different insanity defense tests, and
a jurisdiction’s applicable test will affect the criminal culpability
of an individual suffering from PTSD.27 Accordingly, PTSD
does not appropriately fit in the insanity defense in capital
cases.

A. THE M’NAUGHTEN TEST
According to the M’Naughten Test, to establish an
insanity defense, it must be clearly proven that, at the time the
offender committed the act, the offender was “laboring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know
the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know
it that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.”28
Particularly, the M’Naughten Test solely focuses on an
offender’s ability to know his or her actions were wrong, which
fails to acknowledge the modern understanding of mental
illness that affects an offender’s ability to know or even be
aware of the wrongfulness of his or her actions when
committed.29 In other words, the narrow language of the
M’Naughten Test “ignores most contemporary knowledge of
25

Id. at 37-39.

Insanity Defense Reform Act, Ch. IV, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
2057 (1984).
26

Thomas L. Hafemeister & Nicole A. Stockey, Last Stand? The
Criminal Responsibility of War Veterans Returning from Iraq and
Afghanistan with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 85 IND. L.J. 87, 112
(2010).
27

28

W. Chris Jordan, supra note 24, at 36.

29

Id. at 37.
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psychiatry.”30 Thus, the M’Naughten Test fails to recognize
PTSD as a valid insanity defense because the jurisdictions that
still use this test apply it in a way that is essentially unchanged
despite the advancements in the psychiatry field.31

B. THE MPC TEST
Through the MPC Test, the ALI rejected the outdated
and narrow language of the M’Naughten Test, which solely
focused on cognitive impairments, and presented a broader
standard that looked to cognitive and volitional impairments.32
The MPC Test established a much broader legal concept of
insanity, which recognized more mental defects as a defense,
including PTSD.33 The MPC Test states that “[a] person is not
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirement of law.”34 Accordingly,
in applying the MPC Test, PTSD would likely be grounds for a
valid insanity defense because the effects of PTSD would cause
the offender to lack substantial capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her
conduct to the requirement of law. However, the MPC Test was
abandoned at the federal level and in many states following the
passage of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984.

C. INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM ACT OF 1984
After John W. Hinckley, Jr. was acquitted based on
insanity for the attempted assassination of President Reagan,
many people began to reject the MPC Test because they viewed

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Id. at 38.

33

Id. at 39.

Id. at 38 (citing Am. Law. Inst., Model Penal Code and
Commentaries pt. I §§ 3.01-5.07 at 163 (1985)).
34
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it as too lenient.35 As a result, Congress passed the Insanity
Defense Reform Act of 1984, which again substantially
narrowed the insanity defense in the federal criminal court
system.36 The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 is now
codified in 18 U.S.C. § 17, and treats the insanity defense as an
affirmative defense:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution
under any Federal statute that, at the time of the
commission of the acts constituting the offense,
the defendant, as a result of a severe mental
disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the
nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his
acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise
constitute a defense.37
The language used in the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984
largely resembles the narrow and outdated language of the
M’Naughten Test that distinctly rejects an insanity defense on
the grounds of PTSD.
The applicable test for insanity is inconsistent
throughout the United States. In federal courts, the insanity
defense is governed by the Insanity Defense Reform Act, and
many states have followed suit and adopted its provisions.38
The majority of the remaining states continued following the
MPC standards.39 However, there are notable exceptions
including states using the Durham Product Test or the
diminished capacity standard.40 Accordingly, PTSD does not
appropriately fit within the insanity defense because the array
of tests used in various jurisdictions to determine an offender’s

35

Id. at 39-40.

Insanity Defense Reform Act, Ch. IV, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
2057 (1984).
36

37

18 U.S.C. § 17 (2020).

Louis Kachulis, Note, Insane in the Mens Rea: Why Insanity Defense
Reform is Long Overdue, 26 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOCIAL JUSTICE 245, 250
(2017).
38

39

Id.

40

Id.
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legal sanity leads to inconsistency and arbitrariness in capital
cases involving offenders suffering from PTSD.

V. PTSD AS A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
As previously stated, the effectiveness of the insanity
defense in regard to offenders suffering from PTSD facing the
death penalty, is dependent upon the specific test applied in a
given jurisdiction. Thus, the insanity defense would only be a
sufficient place for such an argument in approximately half of
the jurisdictions throughout the United States. Therefore,
because the insanity defense does not provide an adequate
place for PTSD as a defense, it has been argued that PTSD
should be considered as a mitigating circumstance to be
weighed against aggravating circumstances at the sentencing
phase of a capital case.41
A. THE RISE OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
The rise of mitigating circumstances for individualized
penalty determination began in the 1970s with Furman v.
Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia. Together, the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Furman and Gregg “established that a state capital
sentencing system must: (1) rationally narrow the class of
death-eligible defendants; and (2) permit a jury to render a
reasoned, individualized sentencing determination based on a
death-eligible defendant’s record, personal character, and the
circumstances of his crime.”42
Additionally, in Woodson v. North Carolina, the Supreme
Court found that a mandatory death penalty scheme is
unconstitutional, and determined that a sentencer is required to
look to specific mitigating circumstances to establish an

See Debra D. Burke and Mary Anne Nixon, Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder and the Death Penalty, 38 HOW. L.J. 183, 183 (1994); Jeffery L.
Kirchmeier, A Tear in the Eye of the Law: Mitigating Factors and the
Progression Toward a Disease Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 OR. L. REV.
631, 676 (2004).
41

Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972) and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
42
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individualized penalty determination.43 The Supreme Court
went even further in Lockett v. Ohio by stating that the sentencer
may “not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor,
any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death.”44
Essentially, these cases emphasized the role of
mitigating circumstances or factors in the sentencer’s process of
establishing an individualized penalty determination.
Specifically, Lockett articulated that the defendant’s character,
prior record, and the circumstances of the offense must be
considered by the jury when determining the penalty, and
weighed against the death penalty.45 However, mental illness
was excluded from this list. Even though mental illness was
excluded, some courts have held that an offender’s mental
health plays a mitigating role.

B. MENTAL ILLNESS AS A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
Weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
of a given offender in a capital case is a mere balancing test that
gives little weight to one specific factor. Accordingly, in
applying this balancing test, courts have developed
inconsistent decisions. Specifically, some courts have used
mental health as a mitigating circumstance to render the death
penalty disproportionate,46 while other courts have determined
that mental health does not carry enough weight to find the
death penalty disproportionate.47

43

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).

44

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).

45

Id.

46

See State v. Claytor, 574 N.E.2d 472 (Ohio 1991).

See State v. Ross, 849 A.2d 648 (Conn. 2004); Davis v. State, 148 So.
3d 1261 (Fla. 2014).
47
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1. MENTAL ILLNESS SUCCESSFULLY BARRING THE DEATH
PENALTY
In State v. Claytor, the death sentence of a paranoid
schizophrenic was overturned on the basis that his mental
health as a mitigating factor outweighed the aggravating
factors.48 A psychiatrist and psychologist testified during the
penalty phase of the trial that the defendant was mentally ill,
and “as a result of that illness he lacked the substantial capacity
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.”49
Additionally, the state’s expert witness testified and agreed that
the defendant was “suffering from chronic paranoid
schizophrenia, which occasionally became acute.”50 The
Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the initial death sentence
stating that more weight should have been given to the
mitigating circumstance of the defendant’s mental health.51

2. MENTAL ILLNESS FAILING TO BAR THE DEATH PENALTY
However, other courts have held that mental health
does not carry a substantial amount of weight as a mitigating
factor. Specifically, during the penalty phase of the trial of State
v. Ross, defense counsel claimed, as statutory mitigating factors,
that at the time of the offense the defendant’s mental capacity
was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to rise to the
level of a defense to prosecution.52 Defense counsel further
presented evidence from a psychiatric expert that the defendant
suffered from the mental illness that significantly impaired his
ability to control his actions.53 However, the defendant was
sentenced to death based on a finding that the aggravating
factors outweighed the statutory mitigating factor of mental

48

See Claytor, 574 N.E.2d at 482.

49

Id. at 481.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Ross, 849 A.2d at 695.

53

Id.
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illness, and the Supreme Court of Connecticut ultimately
upheld the defendant’s death sentence.54
Similarly, in Davis v. State, the defendant claimed that
his death sentence was disproportionate punishment based on
the existence of substantial mental illness, which he argued
made the “aggravating circumstances qualitatively less
significant and the mitigation weightier.”55 Although the
Florida Supreme Court took note of the mental health
mitigation, it ultimately rejected Davis’ argument and upheld
the death sentence.56
Even though mental defects have been successfully
used to mitigate the criminal culpability of a defendant as to
render the death penalty disproportionate, it is more common
that an offender’s mental illness is not viewed heavily enough
to outweigh the aggravating factors in a capital case. Thus,
PTSD should carry more weight than a mere mitigating factor.

VI. EXCLUSIONARY CATEGORY FOR OFFENDERS WITH PTSD
As the trend towards better understanding PTSD
continues, offenders with PTSD should be viewed similarly to
intellectually disabled individuals and juveniles. Particularly,
offenders with PTSD at the time of committing the offense
should also be excluded from the death penalty.

A. THE RISE OF EXCLUSIONARY CATEGORIES
The establishment of exclusionary categories exempting
specific classes of offenders from the death penalty began with
intellectually disabled individuals and juveniles. However,
whether intellectually disabled individuals and juveniles
should be subject to the imposition of the death penalty was a
topic of controversy from the 1980s until the Supreme Court
decided in favor of such exclusionary categories in Atkins v.
Virginia and Roper v. Simmons in the early-to-mid 2000s.57
54

Id. at 759.

55

Davis, 148 So. 3d at 1280.

56

Id.

See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 (2005).
57
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1. INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED INDIVIDUALS
In the 1989 case of Penry v. Lynaugh, the Supreme Court
held that it was not a violation of the Eighth Amendment to
sentence mentally incompetent adults to death.58 At a
competency hearing before Penry’s murder trial, a clinical
psychologist testified that Penry was “mentally retarded.”59
Specifically, it was brought to light that Penry had been
diagnosed with an organic brain injury, had an IQ of 54, had the
mental age of a 6 ½-year-old, and the social maturity of a 9-or10-year-old.60 This evidence was raised as mitigating factors
during the penalty phase of trial because the jury did not find
this evidence strong enough to rise to an insanity defense.61
Nonetheless, the court held that Penry’s mental disability did
not prohibit the imposition of the death penalty, and sentenced
him to death.62 Even though the Supreme Court ultimately held
death sentences of intellectually disabled individuals to be
constitutional, the Supreme Court overturned Penry’s
conviction based on the way Texas considered the issue of
executing defendants with such mental defects.63 After a new
trial, Penry was again sentenced to death, but in 2001, “the
Supreme Court threw out Penry’s new death sentence because
the jury was still not properly instructed about mental
retardation.”64
The Court revisited the issue of imposing death
sentences on intellectually disabled individuals in the 2002 case
of Atkins v. Virginia. In August of 1996, Atkins shot and killed a

58

See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).

59

Id. at 307.

60

Id. at 307-08.

61

Id. at 309-12.

62

Id. at 312.

Johnny Paul Penry’s Death Sentence Overturned for Third Time, DEATH
PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/johnny-paul-penrys-deathsentence-overturned-for-third-time (last visited Mar. 10, 2020).
63

64

Id.
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man after robbing and abducting him.65 During the penalty
phase of the trial, the defense relied on a forensic psychologist’s
testimony that Atkins was “mildly mentally retarded.”66 The
psychologist based his conclusion of Atkins’ mental state on
interviews of Atkins’ friends, family, and acquaintances; review
of school and court records; and the results of an intelligence
test that indicated Atkins had an IQ of 59.67 Nonetheless, the
jury sentenced Atkins to death.68 After appealing, Atkins’ case
made its way to the Supreme Court, and the Court determined
that capital punishment of intellectually disabled individuals
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.69

2. JUVENILES
Similarly, in the 1989 case of Stanford v. Kentucky, the
Supreme Court held that sentencing juvenile murderers—ages
16 and 17—to death was not a violation of the Eighth
Amendment.70 In Stanford, two cases were consolidated.71 In the
first case, a 17-year-old boy shot and killed a man, and was
sentenced to death.72 In the second case, a 16-year-old boy
stabbed and killed a convenient store owner, and was
sentenced to death.73 The Supreme Court ultimately upheld
both death sentences and held that there was “neither a
historical nor a modern society consensus forbidding the
imposition of capital punishment on any person who murders
at 16 or 17 years of age.”74

65Atkins

v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002).

66

Id. at 308.

67

Id. at 308-09.

68

Id. at 309.

69

Id. at 321.

70

Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 265-67 (1989).

71

Id. at 364.

72

Id. at 365-66.

73

Id. at 366-68.

74

Id. at 380.
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However, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of
sentencing a juvenile to death in the 2005 case of Roper v.
Simmons, when an approximately 17-year-old boy was
sentenced to death for murder.75 In applying the concept
established in Atkins, the Supreme Court determined that the
imposition of the death sentence on anyone under the age of 18
is disproportionate punishment, thus cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.76

B. TWO-PART TEST ESTABLISHED IN ATKINS AND ROPER
Through Atkins and Roper, the Supreme Court
established a two-part test for analyzing whether the death
penalty is an appropriate form of punishment for a certain class
of offenders under the Eighth Amendment.77 Specifically, there
must be objective evidence of societal discontent with
sentencing a certain class of offenders to death and the court
must subjectively weigh the factors in a given case to determine
whether the death penalty is proportionate.

1. OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE OF SOCIETAL DISCONTENT
First, in determining whether to impose the death
penalty, the Court will look to whether the punishment of death
is proportionate and within the boundaries of the “evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”78 In determining if the punishment is proportionate
and along the lines of human decency, the court examines
“objective evidence of contemporary values.”79 Accordingly,
evidence of disfavor and intolerance for the execution of a
specific class of offenders weighs in favor of a categorical
exemption from the death penalty.80 As seen in Atkins and

75

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555 (2005).

76

Id. at 578.

77

See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 564-79; Roper, 543 U.S. at 311-321.

78

Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.

79

Penry, 492 U.S. at 331.

80

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310.
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Roper, the national consensus plays a major role in death
penalty reform. Specifically, the Court generally focuses on
legislative statistics and practices, and the trend of the national
consensus.
In the years following Penry, a national consensus
against the executions of intellectually disabled individuals
developed.81 This consensus was evidenced by the fact that
many states prohibited such executions, many states chose to
not reinstate the power to conduct such executions, and such
executions were extremely rare in the states that allowed
them.82 Thus, the Court compared the national consensus
during the time of Penry to the national consensus during the
time of Atkins, determining that when Atkins was presented to
the Court there was an overwhelmingly larger amount of
discomfort with and intolerance for the executions of
intellectually disabled individuals than when Penry was
presented.83 Accordingly, the Court, following the “evolving
standards of decency,” created an exclusionary category
exempting a specific class of offenders—intellectually disabled
individuals—from the death penalty.84
Similarly, in the years following Stanford, there was
evidence of a national consensus against imposing the death
penalty on juveniles.85 This national consensus was parallel to
the evidence used in Atkins to establish a national consensus
among Americans against the imposition of the death penalty
on intellectually disabled individuals.86 Likewise, this
consensus provided sufficient evidence that society viewed
juveniles as categorically less culpable than the average
criminal.87 Specifically, the consensus was based on the idea
that a juvenile’s character is not as well-formed as an adult’s,
and because juveniles have a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, they are more vulnerable to
81
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negative influences.88 Again, by following the “evolving
standards of decency” the court created another exclusionary
category exempting juvenile offenders from the death penalty.89

2. SUBJECTIVE FACTORS
The second part of the two-part test in determining the
proportionality of the death penalty as applied to a specific
class of offenders is that the Court is to “determine, in the
exercise of [its] own independent judgment, whether the death
penalty is disproportionate punishment for [the specified class
of offenders].”90 Specifically, the Court is able to use its own
judgment and subjectively consider factors, including
penological goals of punishment, specific mitigating factors
that may entitle a class of offenders to a categorical exclusion,
and whether there is an unacceptable likelihood that a
sentencer could disregard those mitigating factors to still arrive
at a death sentence.91
In Atkins, the Court outlined two rationales as to why
intellectually disabled individuals should be exempt from
capital punishment. First, the Court stated that there was a
serious question as to whether retribution or deterrence applied
to intellectually disabled individuals.92 Second, the Court
looked to the reduced mental capacity of intellectually disabled
individuals as a basis for exempting that specific class of
offenders from a death sentence.93 The Court based its
reasoning for creating a categorical exception for intellectually
disabled individuals on the facts that such individuals have a
reduced capacity and lesser criminal culpability, thus the
general justifications for the imposition of the death penalty—
deterrence and retribution—cannot be satisfied where the
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defendant is an intellectually disabled individual.94
Additionally, the Court found there was an unacceptable risk
that evidence of intellectual disability presented in mitigation
could too easily be construed by a sentencer as an aggravating
factor.95
Similarly, in Roper, the Court questioned the general
justifications for the death penalty. The Court stated that
“retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty
is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is
diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and
immaturity”96 and that “it is unclear whether the death penalty
has a significant or even measurable deterrent effect on
juveniles.”97 Additionally, the Court found that there was an
unacceptable risk that a sentencer may ignore mitigating
arguments based on age and impose the death penalty.98
Accordingly, in both Atkins and Roper, the Court used its own
judgment and subjectively considered specific factors in
determining the fairness of imposing the death penalty on
intellectually disabled individuals and juveniles.
Thus, by looking to the national consensus and
subjectively weighing relevant factors, the Court found it
necessary to create exclusionary categories exempting
intellectually disabled individuals and juveniles from the death
penalty.

C. TWO-PART TEST APPLIED TO OFFENDERS WITH PTSD
Based on the rationale of the two-part test established in
Atkins and Roper, there should be a categorical exclusion from
the death penalty for offenders suffering from PTSD at the time
of the offense.

1. Objective Evidence Showing Societal Discontent for
Executing Offenders with PTSD
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First, by looking to the national consensus, supported
by legislative efforts and social trends, it seems that there is
growing discomfort with and intolerance for imposing the
death penalty on those who suffer from severe mental illness at
the time of the offense, including PTSD. States have so far been
reluctant to adopt categorical bans on the death penalty for
those who have a mental illness.99 Currently, only Connecticut
has a categorical ban that exempts offenders with mental illness
from the death penalty.100 However, many states have
considered death penalty exemption bills for mentally ill
offenders that have yet to be enacted.101 Specifically, in early
2020, seven states proposed legislation that would exempt
offenders with severe mental illness from the death penalty.102
Additionally, the fact that twenty-one states have abolished the
death penalty all together is evidence of society’s disfavor for
it.103 Furthermore, additional states have proposed legislation
to abolish the death penalty.104 Similarly, the fact that seven
states have proposed legislation that would exempt offenders
with mental illness from the death penalty also shows a societal
trend towards intolerance of the death penalty—at the very
least intolerance for the current implementation of it. Therefore,
according to today’s societal standards, imposing the death
penalty on someone who suffers from PTSD is viewed as
disproportionate punishment and beyond the boundaries of the
evolving standards of decency.

Mental Health, Death Penalty Information Center,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policy-issues/mental-illness (last
visited Mar. 10, 2020).
99

100

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-46a (2020).

101

Mental Health, supra note 99.

Recent Legislative Activity, Death Penalty Information Center,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/recent-legislativeactivity (last visited Mar. 10, 2020).
102

See Death Penalty Information Center,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2020).
103

104

Id.

176

7 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2020)

2. SUBJECTIVE FACTORS IN FAVOR OF CREATING AN
EXCLUSIONARY CATEGORY FOR OFFENDERS WITH
PTSD
Additionally, based on the second prong of the two-part
proportionality test, the Court would use its own independent
judgment in determining whether the death penalty is
disproportionate punishment for offenders suffering from
PTSD at the time the offense was committed.105 As previously
seen in Atkins and Roper, the Court would look to deterrence
and retribution.106 Accordingly, the Court should create a
categorical exception for offenders suffering from PTSD at the
time of committing the offense based on the idea that such a
mental defect lessens an offender’s criminal culpability.
Specifically, the general justifications for the imposition of the
death penalty, which are retribution and deterrence, cannot be
satisfied where the offender suffers from PTSD at the time of
the offense. In Atkins and Roper, the Court put a lot of weight on
the concept that it is disproportionate to put an offender to
death when that offender has a reduced criminal culpability. In
Atkins, the Court determined that the criminal culpability of an
intellectually disabled individual was so reduced that putting
an intellectually disabled offender to death would be cruel and
unusual punishment.107 Similarly, in Roper, the Court said that
it would constitute cruel and unusual punishment to sentence
a juvenile offender to death because juveniles are
impressionable, easily influenced, and not yet completely
developed mentally.108 Accordingly, offenders suffering from
PTSD at the time of the offense have an equally reduced
criminal culpability. When PTSD is triggered, the offender acts
without adequate intent, knowledge, or purpose. Rather, the
offender acts as if he or she is re-living the traumatic event that
caused his or her PTSD in the first place.109 Thus, an offender
with PTSD is—at that moment—like an intellectually disabled
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individual or juvenile because PTSD reduces the offender’s
criminal culpability. Therefore, offenders with PTSD should be
exempt from the death penalty because sentencing such
offenders to death does not adhere to the general justifications
of retribution and deterrence.
Furthermore, the Court can use its own judgment and
subjectively consider specific mitigating factors that may entitle
a class of offenders to a categorical exclusion, and consider
whether there is an unacceptable likelihood that a sentencer
could disregard those mitigating factors to still arrive at a death
sentence.110 In considering the parallels between intellectually
disabled offenders, juvenile offenders, and offenders suffering
from PTSD at the time of the offense, the Court should, through
their own subjective judgment, find there to be an unacceptable
risk that a sentencer may ignore the presence of PTSD, or find
an unacceptable risk that the evidence of PTSD would be
viewed as an aggravating factor rather than a mitigating factor.
Therefore, based on the offender’s reduced criminal
culpability and likelihood that the sentencer may disregard
relevant mitigating factors and nonetheless sentence the
offender to death, the Court should subjectively find the death
penalty to be disproportionate punishment for offenders
suffering from PTSD at the time of the offense.

VII. CONCLUSION
In light of the evolving meaning of cruel and unusual
punishment, an offender suffering from PTSD at the time of
committing the offense should be excluded from the death
penalty. Specifically, offenders with PTSD at the time of the
offense should be viewed equivalently to intellectually disabled
individuals and juveniles, rather than the offender’s PTSD be
viewed as a piece of the insanity defense or a mere mitigating
circumstance in capital cases. The Supreme Court has
established a two-part test for creating an exclusionary category
exempting a specific class of offenders from the death penalty.
First, there must be objective evidence of societal discontent
regarding the execution of the specified class of offenders.
Second, the Court must use their own independent judgment
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and consider subjective factors that would lead to the
conclusion that sentencing the specified offenders to death
would be disproportionate punishment. By applying this twopart test to offenders suffering from PTSD at the time of the
offense, there should be an exclusionary category created for
this specific class of offenders from the death penalty. The need
to create such an exclusionary category is supported by the facts
that there is strong objective evidence of societal discontent for
executing offenders who were suffering from PTSD at the time
of the offense and the Court should subjectively find sentencing
such offenders to death to be disproportionate punishment.

